The year of stalemate

2024 has turned out to be the year of stalemate for both the Kremlin and its opponents. The events that defined the political arena for the country included the ongoing war against Ukraine, the assassination of Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Putin beginning yet another term as president. To many, it seems that the current regime will be able to hang on for years and even decades to come. Nevertheless, we deem it important to examine the details and look for possible vulnerabilities in the system.

Three areas have dominated the coverage by leading Russian-language media outlets outside the Kremlin’s control- Radio Liberty, BBC Russian Service, The Moscow Times Russian Service, Meduza, The Bell:

The intensity of the military operation as a whole and the individual battles has steadily increased since the spring of 2024. The pace of the Russian military offensive has also accelerated toward the end of the year, especially in the Donetsk region.

In 2024, the Russian military occupied about 3,300 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. In November, the rate of Russian advance was about 28 square kilometers per day. Almost 20% of Ukrainian territory (about 120 thousand square kilometers, including Crimea) is now occupied. Along with the Crimean territories, almost the entire Luhansk region and significant parts of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions are under occupation.

However, the speed and scale of Russian troop advances is not the main problem at the front. Even at today’s rate of advance, it would take Putin at 46 years to occupy the entire territory of Ukraine. The issue is the impossibility of a counteroffensive by the Ukrainian defense forces and liberation of the captured regions using the approach of the counteroffensives in the Kyiv and Kharkiv regions in 2022. Ukraine’s military, technical and human resources are clearly insufficient for such campaigns. The situation is complicated by constant obstacles to arm deliveries by Western allies. The biggest obstacle in this series was the hold on the U.S. aid in early 2024. The consequences of this action have reverberated for the entire year.

The Russian military advance has come at the cost of heavy human losses. Mediazona, which is conservative in its assessments, notes that 2024 has been the bloodiest year of the conflict so far. As of December 20, there are 84,761 positively identified as dead, and a rough estimate of about 120,000 Russian soldiers who lost their lives in Ukraine. In other words, for every thousand square kilometers of Ukrainian land it occupies, including Crimea, Russia pays with a thousand lives of its citizens.

The new mobilization is fraught with rising tensions in society with poorly predictable consequences. So far, Putin has not announced a new wave of mobilization, instead relying on financial reserves to recruit contractors for the war. According to the official data, about 30,000 contracts are signed every month. The life expectancy of the Russian soldier from the moment a contract is signed is quite short. Moreover, evidence suggests that the number of new contract workers has exceeded the government’s capacity to arm them.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that Ukraine cannot afford to maintain rates of army replenishment comparable to those of Russia. This is the basis for Putin’s relative, situational and rather unstable advantage.

Russia’s weapons and equipment reserves are extensive, but their quality is rather low and will continue to decline. Production of new equipment is slow, and the prospects for restoring military capabilities remain unclear due to sanctions. This is partly offset by imports of drones and shells from Iran and North Korea. The DPRK has also become a source of manpower. Russia has even resorted to importing North Korean servicemen to avoid mobilization. It is too early to judge the effectiveness of these units, but there is evidence that it is low. North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast are already in the hundreds.

A risky, although so far quite successful maneuver was the entry of the Ukrainian Army into the territory of the Kursk region and the seizure of the town of Sudzha. The Ukrainian defense forces now control about 500 square kilometers of internationally recognized Russian territory. This may cause Russians to ponder why they need «new» territories in eastern Ukraine when their «old» ones are not fully under their control? Whether Kyiv is able to use these territories effectively in future negotiations depends on whether it’s able to hold its positions in the Kursk Oblast.

A September poll surveying 800 respondents by the research group «Chronicles» showed that the number of those in favor of withdrawal of Russian troops and a cease-fire without achieving the goals of the war is at 49%, up 9% from February 2023.

An ethnographic survey conducted in several Russian regions after the outbreak of hostilities in 2022–2023 by the Public Sociology Laboratory published in July became a sensation. Oleg Zhuravlev, a researcher at the Lab, summarizes its findings as ”no one in Russia is excited about war”. In his opinion, «there is no joy, pride, there is a sense of common misfortune.” His general recommendations include calling on the political opposition to pay greater attention to developing and communicating an alternative social agenda and a positive image of Russia’s future as an equal and free country.

Published at the end of the year, Maria Snegovaya’s report for the Atlantic Council has also made quite a splash. Unlike most of her Russian colleagues, the author argues that the data from the Levada Center and other «old» polling services can be trusted. She believes that the majority of Russians support the war, and that the «liberal pro-Western segment in the country» constitutes only about 7–10%. Ironically, despite the difference in methodology and interpretation of mass sentiment in Russia, Snegovaya draws virtually the same conclusion as Zhuravlev. She emphasizes a lower level of support for the war among the poor Russians and recommends that anti-war efforts pay more attention to the social needs and demands of Russians.

At the moment, the situation at the front and Russia’s ultimatum demands (recognition of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia regions and Crimea as Russian territory, refusal to join NATO, and «demilitarization») do not seem to be very conducive to a ceasefire.

The fall was marked by a new round of escalation. In November, Russia’s nuclear doctrine was amended to allow nuclear strikes in response to non-nuclear attacks. Shortly thereafter, the US and UK lifted restrictions on long-range missile strikes on internationally recognized Russian territory. In response, the Oreshnik ballistic missile was launched at the Yuzhmash plant in Dnipro. Commenting on the use of the Oreshnik, Putin said that this missile system could replace nuclear weapons. Later, he dared the West proposing an «experiment» with shelling Kyiv, which provoked the anger of Volodymyr Zelensky. Experts regard Russia’s actions as a propaganda move and a failed attempt at nuclear blackmail. Either way, these are definite steps toward escalation, though not catastrophic, but neither conducive to a truce and opening the possibility of expanding hostilities in the future. All sides are tightly bogged down in a military conflict from which there is no real way out.

The most important domestic political event of 2024 was Putin’s reappointment as president through an electoral procedure. In the context of the protracted war, this ritual was particularly important. Along with Putin, only three of the five parliamentary parties- the CPRF, LDPR, and New People- made it to the ballot. The set of candidates was kept as narrow and weak as possible. The goal was clear- to show the lack of alternatives to the incumbent head of state and to ensure maximum votes in his favor.

As opposed to the 70% support of the past election cycles, this year Putin has claimed over 80% in almost all regions, including the occupied territories, produced by multi-day electronic voting. His overall officially publicized result amounted to 87% of the vote. This illustrates a strong desire to create a picture of citizens’ cohesion around the president and to further demoralize the opposition, which was crushed by Navalny’s death.

The rallying of some anti-war Russians around Boris Nadezhdin’s campaign, while significant, did not last. Another unregistered presidential candidate, Ekaterina Duntsova, continues to engage in public politics, trying to remain in the official field. At the end of November, the Ministry of Justice refused to register the Rassvet party founded by Duntsova.

When it comes to his domestic policy, dacha amnesty, credit vacations, and an increase in the minimum wage were the three pillars of Putin’s contract with society. At the beginning of 2024, big and sweet carrots were disbursed to targeted support groups: military personnel, military-industrial complex workers, other public sector employees, patriotic entrepreneurs, IT specialists, and cultural figures.

This coincided with the whipping in the form of point repressions against those framed as a very small and insignificant group of «national traitors» who openly opposed the regime.

On December 20, the list of organizations and individuals designated as foreign agents passed the 900-point mark. The rate of growth of the list of «foreign agents» has slowed down since spring. The number of politically motivated criminal cases has also decreased. In November 2023, according to OVD-Info, there were 3,424 people prosecuted for political reasons in Russia, at the end of 2024, that figure stands at 2,938. The number of political prisoners increased from 1,011 to 1,419 over the same period.

In March, a law was enacted allowing confiscation of property for dissemination of unfavorable information about the Russian military and for calls to overthrow the existing system. Their primary targets are the exiled opposition figures. However, so far, there have been no major and high-profile cases launched under this law.

The Kremlin uses these tactics to subdue the society as a whole, and to keep its elites in fear. In the spring, the punitive machine of the Russian state pivoted from anti-war activists (whose campaigns began to subside inside the country) to high-ranking figures in the Ministry of Defense. Shortly before Sergei Shoigu’s resignation as Defense Minister, his deputy Timur Ivanov had been arrested on charges of taking bribes. After Andrei Belousov took the office as the new minister, arrests and resignations in the Defense Ministry became widespread. Criminal cases are also being brought against high-ranking officials, especially in the regions.

The year was full of reshuffles within the gubernatorial corps: governors were replaced in 13 regions. Most of the new appointees are «Vikings» with no preexisting connections to the regions they are to administer. On the one hand, the replacement of governors can be explained by the amassed economic and managerial problems. On the other hand, before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this practice of mass rotation was standard and was put on pause in 2022–23. In other words, we may simply be observing a return to the norm.

After two relatively static years, the system of interaction between the federal center and the regions has adapted to new conditions. An interesting feature of such adaptation are the attempts by the Presidential Administration to promote Ukraine war veterans in regional and federal politics to increase the attractiveness of military service. However, according to the results of regional elections, war veterans have taken only 5% of the seats in local self-government bodies, with the overwhelming majority becoming municipal deputies. Thus, the political role of former military personnel remains largely symbolic. The «heroes of the SVO» who were cadre politicians before they went to the front are an exception to this rule.

The new contract offered by Putin to the society is now obvious: be loyal to the leader of the nation and he will not let you starve to death. If you prove yourself as a patriot and do not oppose the president’s policy, or better yet, give birth to a child for his future army, you would get a good bonus from the state coffers. If you fight in the war, your income will increase manifold. If you die, your family will receive generous compensation.

However, you find yourself outside the «overwhelming majority» constructed in this way, in the ranks of the splinters who betray the president and his country, depending on the gravity of your crime, you would face fines, prison, confiscation, and, in exceptional cases, death from unknown causes in the zone. By killing Navalny, the regime legalized extrajudicial executions in the territories under its control. Thus, the late Putin’s system is based on the fear of targeted repression and mass bribery of various segments of the population.

The system described above, paradoxically, cannot ensure internal stability and tranquility. The latent protest potential manifests itself with renewed vigor whenever and wherever there is an opening.

Ekaterina Duntsova and her suddenly quite massive support group were not allowed to collect signatures for her presidential nomination, but the baton was immediately passed to Boris Nadezhdin, who was allowed to collect signatures. Huge queues in support of his nomination across the country forced the authorities to reject the two hundred thousand signatures he received and intensify repression.

At the start of the year, Boris Kagarlitsky and Oleg Orlov were sent to prison for draconic terms, and Alexei Navalny died unexpectedly in a Polar colony. The news of Navalny’s death led to mass memorials across the country, a march at his funeral on March 1, and a multi-day pilgrimage of tens of thousands of people to his grave in Moscow. Many also took part in the «Noon Against Putin» rally on the last day of voting on March 17.

The protest potential of Russian society should not be overestimated, especially in the context of the regime’s beastly determination to stand to the end and spare no one in case of trouble. Navalny’s lesson should teach this to everyone. However, the problems of the system are not limited to the latent brooding of the grassroots. The generous distribution of money to the population, which, judging by the president’s message, will only grow, is fraught with inflation and a further fall of the ruble against major world currencies. In the long run, the reduction of the country’s revenues risks the reduction of status rents and the aggravation of intra-elite struggle. But, it is already driving up the demand for an end to the war whose cost to economy is becoming apparent.

Black swans of 2024 included Islamist attacks at the Crocus City Mall in Moscow and at the SIZO-1 in Rostov-on-Don almost immediately after Putin’s reappointment. In both cases, ISIS claimed responsibility. The fact that Russia is bogged down in the Ukraine war makes it more vulnerable to global threats. While the security services were busy dissipating Ukrainian threats and searching for internal enemies (linked to the record number of espionage and treason cases in 2022–2024), Russia found itself unprotected in the face of real terrorists. Putin and security officials blamed Ukraine and the West for organizing the attacks, but they still had to respond to the specific challenge of an Islamist insurgency in Russia.

A rise of xenophobia aimed at migrant workers has followed. The list of laws and orders under which the Interior Ministry can deport foreign citizens without a court decision has almost doubled. Naturalized citizens can now lose their citizenship for failing to register for military service. A law has passed on mandatory Russian language tests for school admissions, which will make it more difficult for children of foreign citizens to access education. High-ranking government officials, in particular the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, do not hesitate to make blatantly xenophobic statements. This is a populist measure designed to strengthen the loyalty of xenophobic-minded citizens, primarily among the employees of the law enforcement agencies themselves. However, such a policy is bound to backfire as Russia is experiencing a severe shortage of labor.

Another recent development is that any representative of the LGBT community can be convicted of extremist activity on the grounds of belonging to the non-existent «international LGBT movement». The relevant articles of the Administrative Offenses Code and the Criminal Code are open to the most expansive interpretations. Almost any action, public or private, can result in a prison term. So far, the enforcement of the 2023 law mainly takes the form of raids on nightclubs and administrative fines for «gay propaganda» and «demonstration of extremist symbols». But there are also criminal cases, with 12 in 2024. Potentially, the targeting of LGBT can take an all-out character similar to the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses.

At the end of July, the Ministry of Justice added another non-existent movement to the list of extremist «the anti-Russian separatist movement». According to the regulator, 55 organizations, including the Free Russia Foundation and Free Buryatiya Foundation, seek to «destroy the multinational unity and territorial integrity of Russia».

At the same time, the criminal situation in the country continues to deteriorate. Murder and infliction of serious harm to health are the most common crimes in the flow of criminal reports on war veterans. Most of the crimes are committed by ex-prisoners, but there are also many crimes committed by military personnel without prior criminal records. This problem will worsen in the future: sooner or later hundreds of thousands of people who are not adapted to peaceful life will return home, and their incomes will drop sharply compared to military salaries. This brewing social catastrophe is another delayed consequence of the Kremlin’s current policy, the effects of which will last for decades, even if the war is stopped now.

The tensions in the regions are rising, and the inaction of the authorities is adding to the growing prices and crime situation. Border regions’ governments can no longer guarantee the security of citizens because they do not have the necessary resources. Social obligations are not fully and very reluctantly fulfilled: for example, flood victims in the Orenburg region have had problems receiving compensation, and residents of the border districts of the Kursk region have had to evacuate from the war zone on their own.

Alexander Khinshtein, an influential State Duma deputy, was assigned to resolve the crisis in Kursk as the Acting Governor. The new governor began his communication with citizens by explaining why the state would not be able to fully restore Rylsk after the missile attack.

Meanwhile, Russia’s regions have entered a new winter season, the previous one marked by numerous on-site heating network failures throughout the freezing cold country.

In his latest publication, Vladimir Milov asserts that the main negative trends in the Russian economy have intensified, making «the stagflation scenario under discussion very real». The Russian economy is slowly but surely going down. No one can guess how long it will take. One can only agree with the opinion that the hole will be deep.

It is worth to highlight what was perhaps the most positive event of 2024, — the release of political prisoners in exchange for Putin’s spies and saboteurs arrested in the West. On August 1, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin, Andrei Pivovarov, Lilia Chanysheva, Oleg Orlov were among the 16 Kremlin’s hostages, including American journalist Evan Hershkovich and other foreigners, freed and transferred from Russia to Germany via Turkey.

2024 has been difficult, but this should not make those working for change in Russia despair. Yes, the year has failed to bring down Putin’s regime, but it has also not seen his triumph in Ukraine. On the surface, the existing system shows sufficient political and economic resilience while continuing to crumble at the edges.

Undercurrents in Russian society are gradually making themselves felt. The deteriorating criminal and economic situation in the country is exacerbated by the growing threat of interethnic clashes. The situation at the Ukrainian battlefields requires efforts from the Kremlin that are incommensurate with its industrial, military and demographic potential. The escalation at the end of the year destroys, rather than brings closer, the prospects of a ceasefire.

Having steamrolled legal protest movements in the country, the regime is unable to overcome what could be called «material resistance». The mismatch between the current policy and the country’s development is so blatant that the Russian soil itself will soon begin to reject the current government.

Worn-out infrastructure, illiterate engineering decisions, shortage of specialists in all sectors, except for budget money expropriation, creates preconditions for a comprehensive and deep collapse. It may have already begun, but those sitting in the Kremlin, or residing at the Patriarchal Ponds and in exclusive suburbs do not see it yet. The people are silent, but in their depths the demand for social justice, peace and freedom is growing stronger. Qualitative sociological studies show, on the one hand, the growing alienation of society from the authorities, and on the other hand, the demands for a competitive environment in politics, free elections and broad popular representation in power, which are increasingly formulated from below.

Over the past year, Putin’s system has demonstrated its main quality-its complete unwillingness and inability to reform from within. Changes «from the top» are almost completely ruled out in today’s Russia. The very logic of Putinism, which was born out of a reaction to reforms in the late USSR, excludes the possibility of such a scenario. History will show what it will lead to. This time everything will be different than in 1985 and 1991. No one can say how long we have left to wait for a new era of change. However, it is quite obvious that this hour has become one year closer.