“The dead usually remain silent”

On February 14, 2025, the Russian Federation returned the body of journalist Viktoria Roshchina to Ukraine.

The Russian state refused to disclose her fate for five months and, even during the exchange process, continued to label the deceased journalist as “the body of an unidentified man.” After the exchange took place, the reasons became painfully clear. Viktoria’s body was missing the brain, trachea, and eyeballs-clear evidence of tampering with the remains in an attempt to conceal Roshchina’s torture and murder. The journalist spent the last year of her life in a Taganrog detention center, where she had been sent after being kidnapped from the occupied territories.

The story of the abduction and murder of a Ukrainian journalist is not unique. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, a large network of secret prisons has been set up in Russia, where hundreds of so-called civilian hostages-Ukrainians abducted from occupied territories under various pretexts-are held. In Russian detention centers, these people are subjected to torture and abuse, and many do not survive long enough to be exchanged or released. The exact number of those kidnapped is still unknown, as most are held under incommunicado status: for the system, these people do not exist.

We sat down with Vladimir Zhbankov, coordinator of the Poshuk. Polon project, to discuss their work, the reasons why the term “civilian hostages” is altogether wrong, and ways to help the victims of war crimes without worsening their already dire situation.

FRF: Let’s start with the basics. Who are civilian hostages?

Vladimir Zhbankov: I’ll answer right away: it’s incorrect to call them that. These people have been kidnapped. Civilians cannot be held captive under any convention. There is a war going on, but it should affect civilian life as little as possible.

And it doesn’t matter whether the government changes or not. In theory, local administrations should continue to function, agreements should still be made, life should go on, teachers should teach, doctors should treat patients, and so on. This should happen under any circumstances. But when people are taken away and simply transported elsewhere, that is kidnapping-not only under international law but also under national law.

FRF: Thank you, Vladimir. It’s important to understand that the very terminology is misleading. But why, then, has the expression “civilian hostages” become so widespread?

Vladimir Zhbankov: Terminology is fluid because the world is changing. The tools and terms we use today were largely created after World War II. Naturally, many regional conflicts have taken place since then.

However, in earlier conflicts, the parties were generally at least somewhat interested in following common rules. Roughly speaking, if we refrain from committing atrocities, then the enemy will do the same. That is the essence of the convention.

In our case, there is one side that does not care about people at all-whether their own citizens or their adversaries, military or civilian. And there is another side that does care, because it has a more or less functioning democracy.

FRF: Who are the most frequent victims of such kidnappings? Are there any factors or risk groups? What is the internal logic behind these crimes?

Vladimir Zhbankov: It all depends on the period we’re talking about. The full-scale invasion has been going on for four years now, and much has changed. For example, in 2022, some citizens from the occupied territories were taken to Russia on what you might call a voluntary-compulsory basis.

FRF: What exactly does that mean?

Vladimir Zhbankov: Oh, it’s very simple. A man with a machine gun comes to a makeshift shelter and says, “That’s it, pack your things, we’re getting on the bus.” Obviously, voluntariness in such a case is very conditional. At the same time, some people didn’t really mind going to Russia even before they were forced to, while others had no intention of going there at all.

Here’s another scenario: the city is being bombed, a bus arrives, and you’re told you’ll be taken away from the shelling. Naturally, many agree. These people are then sent to so-called “filtration camps.“ Approximately 10% of those who enter the camps do not pass filtration and disappear without a trace.

Those who successfully went through all the procedures ended up in Russia, with some eventually leaving and others staying. However, it’s important to note that leaving Russia is not easy. We (Poshuk. Polon) and many other organizations worked extensively with such cases. Those who intended to leave were eventually able to flee the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the Russian government launched a massive propaganda campaign aimed at those who were hesitant about leaving: they were promised mountains of gold, university admission for their children, and apartments. The longer people stayed in Russia, the harder it became to leave.

FRF: But here we are talking about the people who “successfully” passed the so-called filtration.

Vladimir Zhbankov: That’s right. And those who did not, became the first wave of kidnapped civilians. Once you fail the filtration, everything depends on the actions of the occupation administrations.

Usually, anyone connected in any way with the Ukrainian army, police, prosecutor’s office, or courts was at risk in such a situation. But even someone who, say, had been a local police officer under Soviet rule or worked as a municipal official before the war could be in danger. There are also ordinary elderly people who were considered spies simply because they looked out the window or sat on a bench as Russian troops passed by. People with a relative-a husband, son, or brother-serving in the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) or in the Ukrainian police were also at risk.

In other words, any connection with the Ukrainian authorities, even the most tenuous, puts you in danger.

In general, cases are fabricated depending on what the occupation authorities are “missing.” Some will be declared spies, others terrorists. Social networks are also used as a tool in this fabrication process, including retroactively: someone may have posted something years ago, and under the current laws of the Russian Federation, it counts as extremism.

Anyone can be declared a spy or informant, regardless of age. Teenagers sometimes find themselves in situations where law enforcement officers message them, offering opportunities to commit illegal acts. Sometimes the mere fact of such correspondence is enough, but in other cases romantically inclined young people respond to the provocation and attempt to act it out.

And, of course, anyone involved in any kind of activism is automatically in danger-whether you are an environmentalist or even a bat rescuer. If you’re an environmentalist, you might oppose gasoline being dumped into a local river. Then there’s simply the human factor: neighbors can always report you.

FRF: Can you give an example?

Vladimir Zhbankov: Sure. There is a well-known case of Olena Yagupova, who was reported by her neighbors because her husband was serving in the AFU. But of course, they didn’t do this simply because they were bothered by the fact that Olena’s husband was in the army. (Learn more about Olena’s story here — FRF note.)

FRF: You’ve described very broad risk groups. Would it be accurate to say that repression in the occupied territories differs not only quantitatively but also qualitatively?

Vladimir Zhbankov: Yes and no. On the one hand, Russia has been “groomed” for a long time, while the Russian authorities have only recently arrived in the occupied territories, so the people there are naturally treated with particular suspicion. But the methodology is roughly the same, and the classic “repression randomizer” works. There are quantitative differences, of course, and it is also easier to fabricate cases. For example, in Russia, for obvious reasons, fewer people engage in actions that the repressive authorities could interpret as terrorism.

Take arsonists targeting military registration offices: they are now appearing in Russia as well, but the number of such cases is still nowhere near what we see in the occupied territories. In Ukraine, the local population does not sympathize with this gang of invaders. There were even heroic grandmothers who poisoned occupiers with pies laced with rat poison. That is also why there are more law enforcement officers in the occupied territories: people were brought in from all across Russia, even from Khanty-Mansiysk.

There is virtually no region in the Russian Federation that has not been affected by these relocations of forces. The reason is simple: from the perspective of the occupation administration, these are suspicious regions with a suspicious population.

FRF: I see. You mentioned that the tactics of abductions changed over the course of four years. Can you tell us more about that?

Vladimir Zhbankov: The Russian authorities were very frightened by what they witnessed in Ukraine in 2022, when the ground was literally burning beneath their feet. They expected to be welcomed with open arms, but nothing of the sort happened. Naturally, they were very offended. Immediately after the occupation, there were more arrests, targeting anyone who might have noticed something, failed to flee in time, or did not demonstrate sufficient loyalty to the new authorities. Then the territory was cleared, and the pace slowed down. However, the process is still ongoing; it has not stopped since 2014. The authorities also have quarterly reports to submit and must demonstrate that they are doing their job.

FRF: Let’s talk about the reaction of the international community. How well known are these cases abroad, for example, among human rights activists in Europe and the US?

Vladimir Zhbankov: Unfortunately, these cases are largely unfamiliar to the international community. Moreover, the information is generally insufficiently documented. When it comes to the so-called “shadow prisons” where kidnapped civilians are held, Rzhevka-2 remains the most widely known. There is accurate information on this facility because it was registered as a pretrial detention center. At the same time, most prisoners are not held in specially created facilities, but in ordinary prisons-alongside Russian prisoners, simply in some kind of separate enclosure.

For example, imagine a detention center with three buildings, where ordinary prisoners are held. One day, the military police arrive, evict two buildings, and consolidate them. The vacated buildings are then filled with kidnapped civilians. The military police administer all this, but formally there is no special prison for civilians or military police within the detention center. There are regular prison and the Federal Penitentiary Service administration. Since officially there are no military police, civilians, or prisoners of war on the premises, these people formally do not exist. Accordingly, no lawyer can access them, there is no criminal case, no parcels, no letters, no transfers, no calls, no prison shop, no personal account-nothing at all.

This is how Russia achieves incommunicado status for abducted persons. When we search for them, we write requests and usually receive the following response: “Citizen so-and-so has been detained for opposing the Special Military Operation and is located on the territory of the Russian Federation.” In other words, they are presumably scattered across the entire Russian Federation like electrons in their orbit. But where exactly these people are located is unknown. However, such a response indicates that the person we are looking for is still alive.

In general, there is a lack of information on these cases, and they are almost completely unknown in the West. When you bring this up, people often just stare in amazement and disbelief, saying, “But that’s illegal!” For them, it’s as if someone told them about a flying cow. Moreover, it is not very clear how to classify these crimes. In the West, people understand, for example, how military personnel are kidnapped. It happens to civilians too, but more often to military personnel: people are taken, thrown into some terrible basement, and tortured for years. Human rights activists have seen this particular crime many times, not only in this war, so it is clear how to classify it and what actions to take.

It is an entirely different matter when a person is sent to an official institution-a prison or detention center-but officially they are not there, and no one is allowed to check on them. Those of us who work on these cases can report on the precedents, but it doesn’t help much: Western human rights activists have never seen anything like this themselves. And they have no chance of seeing it: no Western representative will ever be allowed into these “shadow prisons.“ In fact, no one except security service agents is allowed inside.

So, it is very convenient for Russia to simply deny everything. After all, there is no information proving that the missing people are being held somewhere against their will. They are simply located “on the territory of the Russian Federation.” Maybe they were even given an apartment there.

FRF: As far as I know, there are also cases where people travel to Russia willingly. Until recently, there were very strong ties between Russia and Ukraine, including literal family ties for many people. Traveling between the two countries was completely normal. Does this situation somehow influence how the context is understood in the West?

Vladimir Zhbankov: Yes, people did leave of their own accord, of course. Imagine: your house is being bombed, and your niece lives somewhere in Yekaterinburg. Who would refuse the chance to get to safety? That’s one side of it.

On the other hand, the Russian authorities launched a large-scale propaganda campaign encouraging people to move to Russia. They promised everything: housing, jobs, and schools for children. “Just come, and everything will be fine.“ Then, of course, they often took people to some beautiful village in the middle of nowhere, took away their passports, and forbade them to leave. Where can a person go without a passport? Especially since they came voluntarily. Now they are stuck in this village-of course, not very voluntarily-but how can they prove it?

There was a story like this about one grandmother. They promised her that if she went to Ivanovo, her grandson would be admitted to any university there and they would be given an apartment. They arrived, spent a year there, and received neither an apartment nor any support. They had nothing to eat, and it was a miracle they eventually got out.

Also, sometimes people have no choice but to adapt. There is also the fear of returning-they don’t know how they will be received at home. Russian propaganda constantly tells them that everyone in Ukraine hates them now, that no one needs them.

In general, the specifics are quite complicated and largely unknown to those unrelated to these countries and their long, complex relationships.

FRF: What is essential to know about the history of civilian abductions?

Vladimir Zhbankov: First, it is much more difficult to search for kidnapped civilians. For example, there might be a small town where fighting took place, and then the town was liberated-but a person is missing. They are not at home in Ukraine. The body is nowhere to be found. Where is this person? There are several possibilities. Perhaps they were killed and buried under the nearest bush. Perhaps they are in one of the “shadow prisons,“ or maybe they are subjected to forced labor somewhere in Russia.

Soldiers, on the other hand, are all registered and accounted for. There is a unit, the unit has a commander, and if a soldier goes missing, a report is filed. Military personnel cannot just disappear because somewhere there is a record proving they existed-even if they are not at their place of registration, and their disappearance is recorded.

It’s different with civilians: they are not registered anywhere. Therefore, when a search initially begins, much depends on the Ukrainian police, who must first try to locate the missing person within the country. Maybe they haven’t disappeared at all but simply ran away to a distant relative. If the person really has vanished, then all hell breaks loose.

FRF: What happens to them?

Vladimir Zhbankov: The fates of those who are kidnapped are roughly similar. First, as I mentioned, torture begins from the moment of detention, in order to break the person immediately. This is a standard Russian method that existed even before the full-scale invasion. Then, in one form or another, the “basement stage” begins. This could mean being locked in a literal basement, a local police station, a facility for administrative detainees-anything, really. The basement stage lasts as long as the kidnappers want it to.

What happens “in the basement?” Torture. It is used to fabricate criminal cases, extract confessions, persuade people to cooperate, and obtain all available information-for example, for counterintelligence-about neighbors, acquaintances, and their entire lives. For the repressive machine to work, it is necessary to gather material and new names. This allows them to continue putting pressure on people and, if necessary, form fake terrorist groups out of them-just like in Stalin’s time. “Name all your acquaintances, and we will turn them into a Trotskyist cell.“

FRF: Taking this into consideration, do you believe it is fair to claim that the repressive apparatus in the occupied territories is similar to what happened in the USSR during the Great Terror? How accurate is this comparison?

Vladimir Zhbankov: They still fall short of the peak form of the Soviet machine. There is not enough motivation, there is a lack of all those romantic ideas about revolutionary struggle, and there is no enthusiasm like there was at the beginning of the 20th century. People in the system mainly pursue their own benefit; not many are dedicated maniacs. That certainly doesn’t stop the undedicated ones from committing monstrous atrocities. Compared to the period of the Great Terror, it is not yet all-encompassing. It’s important to understand that we do not know the exact number of executions: the dead usually remain silent. We can only talk about those we can reach and those who ultimately survive. No one knows how many people are actually being held incommunicado-not even the Russians.

FRF: Does the Ukrainian side have any approximate data on the number of people currently missing?

Vladimir Zhbankov: We do have data, but it is unfortunately very approximate. We know a person is missing, but where they are and whether they are alive is another question. That is why it is so important to obtain the document from the Russian side stating that the person has been “detained for opposing the SMO.” In such cases, we know for sure the person is alive and being kept in Russia. Another option is to find a criminal case. If that happens, we can contact the abductees directly. Otherwise, nothing is clear.

Take, for example, Mariupol, which is now quite literally standing on bones-at some point, there was no one left to bury the dead, so neighbors buried their neighbors. Then Russian builders came and started constructing houses, pouring concrete over everything. A significant portion of those lying under that concrete are still listed as missing.

FRF: You mentioned killings. Are there any statistics or analyses that give an idea of who most often becomes the victims of such killings?

Vladimir Zhbankov: Again, it’s difficult to answer because dead people don’t get a chance to tell us. There aren’t many statistics published on this subject either. Many investigations are carried out by independent journalists, but they are mostly very emotional in nature, which somewhat reduces their credibility.

FRF: For instance, there is a popular opinion that when Russian soldiers come, they simply murder everyone. How accurate is that?

Vladimir Zhbankov: It’s important to recognize the pattern. When one starts looking into it, it becomes obvious that this is not the case. The exact approach being used is not yet clear, although there definitely is one. In some cases, a person could simply have been unlucky: let’s say a convoy is coming and a civilian walks toward it. The column fears that this civilian will betray them, so they kill everyone they see. There are also cases when the military enters apartments and kills people there. In such situations, it is difficult to reconstruct the logic behind the crimes. Those who kill will not tell; those who died will certainly not tell.

FRF: How unique are these horrific acts in comparison to other recent military conflicts?

Vladimir Zhbankov: Every military conflict is unique. We have seen terrible military conflicts in Africa, but Africa is very specific. We have not seen anything like this in Europe, so in this sense, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict stands apart. It cannot be compared to Yugoslavia in terms of scale or the nature of the forces involved. We won’t even mention Moldova. There have been no large-scale conflicts in Europe since World War II. And all this has been going on not since 2022, but since 2014.

FRF: And now for the standard question. What can human rights defenders, activists, and the international community do to influence the situation?

Vladimir Zhbankov: If I knew for sure, I would have done it already. But let’s put it this way: in addition to helping, it’s very important not to cause harm. When a person is deprived of their freedom, they cannot adequately assess the external situation. At any moment, they could be charged with a new crime, and if they lose their lawyer, they could be subjected to literally anything. They could be labeled an extremist 18 times over. Therefore, before disclosing information about individual cases, we need to make sure it will not harm the person.

On the contrary, a general understanding of the situation-what is actually happening-should be disseminated as widely as possible. We need to constantly remind people of the basics: that occupation is bad, that widespread torture is very bad, and that waging an aggressive war is absolutely terrible. The torture I am talking about is widespread and systematic.

FRF: Will we ever be able to find and punish those responsible?

Vladimir Zhbankov: We will definitely find the most prominent ones, the local stars. Some, of course, will flee to Latin America and live there happily ever after. But believe me, there will be plenty of work for all of us. It will take many hands to clean up all the consequences.