Political exiles are key to civil society in Russia

It is important to distinguish the community of political exiles from the global Russian diaspora.

The mere fact of leaving Russia and residing abroad does not make one a political exile. The largest segment of the Russian diaspora consists of seekers of a better life who left Russia or other former Soviet countries for economic or personal reasons over the years. Some, severing all ties with their homeland, have integrated into new societies, others visit Russia regularly. Many, though not all, remain loyal to Putin. This is due, in part, to a widespread apolitical attitude but also to pragmatic considerations: criticizing Russian authorities can cut off access to Russia where many still have relatives, usually parents. Unfortunately, we see that a moderate pro-Putin stance is often considered common to the entire Russian diaspora by the receiving countries.

The community of political exiles, on the other hand, consists of people who decided, or, for the most part, were forced, to leave Russia not for personal or economic reasons but for moral and political ones. The core of this community comprises activists, journalists, human rights defenders, and their families who faced repression, if only for refusing to go to war, which is something that many in the West struggle to acknowledge. They maintain their beliefs, deliberately preserve connections with like-minded people in Russia, and spend a lot of energy keeping in touch with them.

Many of those who had left without any activist experience gained some in exile and thus banished themselves from home permanently. Counting family members, quite a considerable community has been formed in the West. According to The Bell, at least 650,000 people left Russia at the outbreak of the war and have not returned. They are unevenly spread across different cities and countries; in places where political exiles are concentrated (Berlin, Vilnius, and, until recently, Tbilisi), their local communities reach several thousand, making them a noticeable force even at the regional level.

A separate issue has to do with the children of emigrants with ethnic ties to Russia who have lived in Western countries since birth or an early age (mainly in Germany, the United States, and Israel) or were born in the former Soviet Union, primarily in the Baltic states. They are most often in no way connected to contemporary Russian society and have only a vague understanding of the life and problems of modern Russia, yet external observers often equate them with political exiles within the framework of the term ‘diaspora’-despite the fact that the relationships between Western governments and their citizens or permanent residents, even those historically connected to Russia, remain an issue of their domestic policy.

Exiled community is diverse; Russian society, spread out as it is over an immense territory, even more so. Accepting the claim that Russian society is monolithic and is rallying around Putin is beneficial only to Putin himself because it renders any opposition to him meaningless. Shockingly, this mantra is repeated by many structures and institutions whose declared goal is to resist Putin and his influence.

Throughout its existence, the Soviet regime insisted that the majority of the USSR’s citizens supported it. During the Cold War, however, this claim did not convince Western elites and Soviet dissidents that working with Soviet society was futile and that all Soviet citizens should simply be labelled Communists. Western countries went to great lengths to seek out and support individuals and groups within the Soviet society that disagreed with the authorities. This was ultimately successful: the collapse of the USSR in 1991 showed that the real support for the communists was much lower than stated.

Today, working with people in Russia is much easier than in the 1950s and 1980s. First, means of communication and dissemination of information have radically improved. Second, all attempts to isolate Russian society from the outside world are thwarted by the experience gained by its members in previous years. An essential element of this experience is regular contact with family and friends who have gone abroad, facilitated by the fact that it’s still possible to leave Russia as a tourist or emigrant. The existence of a large and well-connected community of political exiles is the third circumstance that distinguishes contemporaneity from the Soviet era. In the Soviet times, all those who went abroad for permanent residence for political or moral reasons were doomed to sever contacts with their friends and relatives. They had to rely on occasional letters, telegrams, and phone calls at best.

Russia remains a complex and contradictory country whose inhabitants have diverse world views. If we take this fact as a starting point, clear prospects for working with Russian society emerge. There is no need to try to reach out to everyone, wasting resources and time on known Putinists or apolitical conformists. Instead, we should focus on those segments of Russian society that are disloyal or not fully loyal to Putin for various reasons.

Political exiles are a part of Russian civil society; they don’t have to establish communication from scratch with those who fully or partially share its values and views on the regime. Since they see themselves part of Russian civil society even post-relocation, they interact with those whose views differ more easily.

Political exiles also have diverse ideologies; there are both conservatives and radical leftists among them. They represent different regions, different peoples, and Russia as a whole and have different visions for their future. This diversity is an advantage that should be used. Instead of fruitless attempts to unite everyone and develop some common messages for Russia, it would be more effective to create a setting where different political groups within the exiled community work with different segments of civil society within Russia.

The first practical task that the Russian anti-Putin diaspora in Western countries can and should accomplish is to become an interlocutor between Western and Russian civil societies. In the context of communication difficulties, personal connections and networks remain the most reliable way to gain insight into the situation in Russia from the West, and vice versa. Putin’s regime is extremely interested in marginalizing political emigration. Any emigrant who is disillusioned, degraded, or beaten down by life becomes a potential prey for Russian security services as well as propaganda fodder, being touted as someone who chose «Western values,” «betrayed his homeland,” and now «lives in a garbage dump.” It was an oft used Soviet narrative, and it is still popular today. Some exiles actively promote this self-marginalizing narrative. Such talk should be recognized as harmful and treated as a form of Putin’s propaganda.

There are plenty of well-known and reputable people and organizations in political emigration whose dialogue with Western leaders and civil society in Russia has never been interrupted. It is crucial to continue and expand this dialog, it should be approached systematically. The community of political exiles can provide Western elites with expertise of unique quality and depth; it is already doing this, but the potential is much wider.

The second pressing task of political emigrants is to develop programs and concepts for the democratic development of Russia after Putin and to discuss them broadly. This discussion should include the opinions of the civil society in-country, currently severely restricted by censorship and repression. It is necessary to raise the level of political discussions, broaden their base, and widely inform Russian civil society that Russian political life is not confined to Putin’s officialdom.

The third important task is to preserve and develop the potential of exiled opposition leaders, to constantly search for, train and support those who are ready and willing to return to Russia after Putin and actively participate in the political process there. To make this task easier, relevant educational programs should be developed. Free Russia Foundation is coordinating such projects, but the demand for them is clearly much bigger, and their implementation requires substantial resources.

In recent history, many former exiles played prominent roles in political systems that emerged from the ruins of collapsed dictatorships. The political future in Russia after Putin will exist for those who will have stayed in touch with the country, who will have retained their connection with people in Russia and respect for their interest in themselves and in their ideas. The only way to participate in Russian politics will be through free elections; aspiring candidates in exile should assess their activities from this perspective as well.

In the coming years, Russian political emigrants will have to make these very difficult tasks their priority.