Sergei Davidis and Ivan Pavlov on the lessons of last year’s exchange, the future of political prisoners, and practical tools for fighting for freedom
August 05, 2025
A year ago, on August 1, 2024, a historic exchange of political prisoners took place between Russia, Belarus, and Western countries. This exchange turned out to be the largest since the end of the Cold War. In various forms the process had been underway since 2022, but for a long time there was no certainty on whether this would happen at all.
In April 2024, after a period of stagnation the parties resumed negotiations, and at the end of July, a group of Russian political prisoners unexpectedly “vanished” from places of detention. On August 1, 2024, they all landed at Cologne Airport. Those released included, a human rights defender Oleg Orlov, politicians Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin, Ksenia Fadeeva, Lilia Chanysheva, and Andrei Pivovarov, an artist Sasha Skochilenko among others.
A year has passed since the historic exchange, yet the discussions continue. Is it possible to make deals with dictatorships, exchanging innocent people for criminals and murderers? Will there be new exchanges, and if so, who will be on the lists and how will these people be selected? Finally, could the exchange really solve the global problem of fabricated political cases in a country where the number of convictions for “treason” alone has quadrupled over the past three years?
Free Russia Foundation discussed this with a human rights defender Sergei Davidis and a lawyer Ivan Pavlov.
FRF: Immediately after the exchange, there was a lot of discussion about its legitimacy and the very nature of these kinds of “deals with dictatorships”. What is your opinion on this? And more broadly, how does it work, and how should exchanges be understood within the broader framework of international politics?
Sergei Davidis: I don’t think it’s appropriate to discuss exchanges in the plural, because in fact there was only one. There were also examples of exchanges of detained foreigners for spies, but that is a slightly different story.
Namely, political prisoners were exchanged only once, a year ago. I fully understand the logic behind the objections, and it deserves respect. On the one hand, it is true that real criminals, who have been found guilty by an independent court in a democratic procedure, are being released in exchange for people who have committed no crimes.
At the same time, we need to consider that dictatorships have the potential to imprison as many people as they wish, we are talking about thousands of people here. While it is unrealistic for a democratic state’s court to convict such a large number of potential exchange funds. Because in democratic states you only go to prison if you really committed a crime. So, in a way, it really is a deal. On the other hand, you can’t just say, “Well if it’s a deal, then we better just let all of these innocent people rot in prison.”
I believe that, under the current circumstances, exchanges, when they occur, should be welcomed. After all, there are many tools available to prevent crimes inspired by dictatorships in democratic countries. These include not only courts and prison terms, but also preventive work by special services and thorough monitoring. Furthermore, as we can see, the exchange is a singular event, it’s pretty unique. And since it is not systematic, it can certainly be welcomed.
FRF: I see, so it’s not a systemic phenomenon yet, but is it worth trying to turn it into a system, hypothetically? Do you think this would solve the problem of politically motivated cases? And if it doesn’t help, what alternative approach could be taken?
Sergei Davidis: No, even regular exchanges won’t be the solution. The problem will only be solved by releasing all political prisoners; no country should have political prisoners. I understand that this sounds like some utopian dream, but no dictatorship exists in a vacuum, and Putin’s dictatorship is no exception. No matter how much Putin’s Russia pretends to be completely autonomous from the Western world, in reality, of course, this is not the case. Just look at how the Russian leadership is now trying to appease Trump. This is a clear demonstration that any dictatorship can be influenced.
In regard to your second question: I believe that the release of those deprived of their freedom for their anti-war or pro-Ukrainian stance should be the condition for peace negotiations. No war lasts forever, and one day these negotiations will certainly take place.
FRF: Do you think Russia will agree to these terms?
Sergei Davidis: I do. Moreover, the Russian Federation already included a certain “amnesty for political prisoners” in its memorandum presented in Istanbul. It is not yet clear what this means, but the Russian side did so of its own accord. Obviously, this means they consider it a bargaining position. There is an initiative called People First[1], launched jointly by Memorial and the Ukrainian human rights organization Center for Civil Liberties. It is a campaign that demands that the US administration makes the release of all prisoners of war a prerequisite for peace negotiations. The term “prisoners of war” here refers to illegally arrested civilians, prisoners of war, deported children, and Russian political prisoners. The initiative has already been supported by more than 70 human rights organizations around the world. Authorities in various countries have also taken note of it and expressed their support. It is clear that the release of people who have been illegally deprived of their freedom should be the key element of any peace negotiations. And there is no reason to believe that this is an absolutely unachievable condition.
FRF: So, does that mean that the West has some leverage over Russia, something that could make such a release possible?
Sergei Davidis: Putin’s regime likes to boast that it benefits from sanctions. But, of course, this is not the case. Sanctions always have a long-term effect, and we are already witnessing economic decline in Russia, so it is obvious that the Russian leadership is interested in lifting the pressure of sanctions. The possibility of lifting sanctions will certainly arise as a topic of discussion in the negotiations. That’s why it’s crucial that the release of those illegally detained by Russia becomes a fundamental condition. That would be a systemic solution.
FRF: I see. Back to the topic of possible future exchanges: how are the lists formed? How do human rights defenders and governments pick the candidates for potential exchanges? Is there any chance that lesser-known political prisoners will end up on these lists?
Sergei Davidis: It is difficult to say anything definite about the possibility of new exchanges. Perhaps there will be one more, or two at most. Although it is not yet clear who the political prisoners will be exchanged for. As for the lists, people who are not well known obviously have fewer chances of being included. See, the creation of such lists is a political decision made by the authorities of those countries that release someone in exchange for Russian political prisoners.
Political leaders must understand why they are making the decision to facilitate the exchange of individuals, and, what’s even more important, the citizens should understand and support it as well. Roughly speaking, these cases should be promoted to society. Because in democratic countries, the state has to be responsible for the decisions it makes. If there is no information on a particular person, it is impossible to convince your citizens that they should be freed.
Another option is to create some kind of open list for all persons who are deprived of their freedom for political reasons and deserve to be released according to the broadest possible criteria. Here, fame won’t play a fundamental role, since we are talking about formal criteria.
FRF: And what are these criteria?
Sergei Davidis: Well, for example, certain respected and authoritative organizations recognize these people as political prisoners and believe that they should be included in the list. But here we are talking about a situation where many prisoners are released simultaneously, like in the aforementioned scenario with the negotiations.
It is likely that even in that case Putin’s regime will say, no, we won’t release 3,000 people. We will only release a thousand. Then the arguments and cases will again be analyzed and reevaluated. But, in general, the publicity factor certainly plays a big role. And in the end, when there’s no information on a person, it is often the result of their own position, the tactics of their relatives or lawyers. That is, they do not want publicity.
But let’s take another look at the list of people released a year ago. These are mainly either foreign nationals, people with dual citizenship, or truly prominent public figures whose cases were actively promoted and publicized in the media. And by the way, this is not the same as “social capital.” For example, Dmitry Talantov’s social capital as a lawyer was very high, but he lacked media recognition. Sasha Skochilenko had no media coverage at all until a large-scale campaign was launched in her support.
FRF: This is especially important nowadays, when the number of political prisoners is growing exponentially, and many of them are common people with no media ties or fame. Let’s discuss the current situation in a little more detail. Ivan, in recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of arrests under the article on treason. In your opinion, what is the Russian state’s interest in this? Why is this particular criminal article being used — how is it convenient or beneficial to the authorities?
Ivan Pavlov: This is a sign of wartime. In fact, we witnessed the first wave of such accusations back in 2015. Previously, there were two or three convictions per year under this article, but in 2015, courts already considered 15 cases. Until the full-scale invasion, this figure remained almost unchanged. But after February 2022, there was another surge. Since the new criminal code was introduced in 1997, only 200 trials for treason, espionage, and confidential cooperation occurred. At the same time, in just three years of the conflict, we have recorded 800new cases under these articles. That is four times more than in the previous 25 years. These are the statistics. The reason, probably, is that the government has already established the image of external enemies. Meanwhile the search for internal enemies is governed by these very articles in the criminal code.
FRF: Are most of these accusations related to contacts with Ukraine? Or are there cases involving other “unfriendly states”?
Ivan Pavlov: Currently, it is mostly Ukraine. Previously, there were even examples of trials for espionage for the benefit of “friendly” China. However, over the past three years the overwhelming majority of cases involve Ukraine.
FRF: How does the inner mechanism of these fabrications work? There seems to be a recurring pattern. Recently, we witnessed several cases featuring very young people, all following a similar scenario: some strangers pretending to be foreigners reach out to the members of opposition communities online and provoke them into actions that qualify as crimes. To what extent has this become systematic?
Ivan Pavlov: Let’s start by figuring out what “treason” is and how it works. Legally treason can take four forms. The first two are classic, meaning they have been implemented since the introduction of the new criminal code in 1997. These are: 1) The disclosure of state secrets: a person with access to state secrets discloses them to foreigners. 2) Espionage. In this case, the person does not have access to state secrets, but presumably seeks out and obtains this information to then pass it on to foreigners. The third form is the most vague. It implies providing any assistance to foreigners in activities “directed against the security of Russia.” This form has only been used since 2022, with the first case being the accusations and arrest of Vladimir Kara-Murza. Prior to that, the article was not used at all.
FRF: You said there was also the fourth option.
Ivan Pavlov: The fourth option is defecting to the enemy. It also first appeared in 2022. Changes to the Criminal Code, Article 275 were made in order to secure the implementation of this form. Defecting to the enemy is, in part, what you are describing. It’s when young people are caught, say, at the airport. Or they are charged even before they attempt to leave the country. The correspondence itself usually serves as evidence. And most often, according to our observations, it is a provocation. Indeed, someone who claims to be a foreigner enters into correspondence, but in reality, they are employees of the authorities.
FRF: It seems that cases involving treason are increasingly linked to accusations of terrorism. To what extent is this a systemic trend? Is the increase in such accusations directly related to the war?
Ivan Pavlov: Indeed, law enforcement agencies have begun to charge individuals with both treason and terrorism quite frequently. For example, participation in the activities of the Russian Volunteer Corps[2], which is recognized as a terrorist organization in Russia. According to law enforcement officials, such charges work as an ideal combination of crimes. This is supported in every way by the courts.
FRF: Let’s talk about the dynamics of repression in general. For a long time, the repressive system in Russia looked like a series of isolated, chaotic strikes—a so-called “randomizer.” But now, with the number of cases involving “serious” charges growing rapidly, is it fair to say that the approach is becoming more systematic, even if not “total” in the Soviet sense? Has there been a qualitative shift?
Ivan Pavlov: You are absolutely correct about the randomizer. That is exactly how repression works. The state has to constantly raise the stakes, increase the terms, and be tougher.
However, it is unlikely that repressions ever become total, first of all because there are no resources for that. Secondly, there is no need for it either.
The mass effect arises independently due to the spread of information via the internet and propagandist media. If Stalin had had the internet and Channel One, he could probably have gotten away with targeted repression as well. Here, the effect is achieved through the rapid spread of information about the accusations. At the same time, repression is also growing exponentially in terms of quantity. For example, in 2024, 360 convictions were handed down for treason and espionage. The 2015 norm was 15 convictions, and even earlier it was 2-3 convictions per year. In other words, convictions for treason were handed down every day, including weekends and holidays. So no, the repression will not be total, but it will still grow in terms of numbers. It is possible that 500-600 convictions will be handed down this year. It seems like a lot, but Russia has a population of 150 million people.
Another important thing is that cops themselves are not interested in mass prosecutions, because the more cases you get, the less valuable they become. Big treason cases mean career advancement, bonuses, and awards. If the repressions grow and become mundane their influence on the wellbeing of law enforcement officers’ declines.
FRF: What can human rights defenders and activists do to support those who are being persecuted on political grounds? What real tools do we have to help?
Ivan Pavlov: First and foremost, it is, of course, providing information. When rights are not being upheld, the involvement of a defense lawyer can break through the information blockade and establish communication with loved ones and the public. So that the public knows what is happening inside. And so that the prosecuted people know that the public cares about them and is waiting for them. Unfortunately, for the most part, the role of defenders has been reduced to a kind of palliative care or harm reduction.
FRF: Thank you. Sergey, do you think people are getting tired of the topic of war and repression? What can we do in a situation where engagement is declining and fatigue is growing?
Sergei Davidis: Well, of course, there is some fatigue. Three years later attention to the war and all the accompanying circumstances had somewhat waned. But we are talking about the reaction of ordinary people, consumers of information. Politicians are still interested in the release of political prisoners. To understand this one has to remember that state policy is made up of many components. Democratic states will not engage in activities that their citizens perceive as harmful, unnecessary, or dangerous. The release of political prisoners, while not generating enormous enthusiasm, is certainly perceived as a good thing. Voters in Europe will not take to the streets in their millions shouting “free Russian political prisoners”. But that is not necessary. The main thing is that freedom and the absence of political repression are values that European citizens continue to support.
FRF: Do you think it is also fair about the US?
Sergei Davidis: I absolutely do. In general, commitment to democratic values remains the credo of the vast majority of European governments as well as organizations like NATO, for example. As for the United States, it is worth remembering that it was precisely through the efforts of the United States that Tsikhanousky and other Belarusian political prisoners were recently released. Of course, it would be foolish to think that Trump literally dreams of freeing all political prisoners across the globe. Biden probably didn’t dream of that either. Such exchanges are political decisions made by people who bear enormous responsibility. The rights of foreign political prisoners and democratic values in other countries are only one aspect of this enormous responsibility. However, humanitarian and political achievements are still important for the reputation of politicians and presidents. Belarusian political prisoners have been released twice with the assistance of the US administration. This means that the same could happen with Russian political prisoners.
FRF: Yes, that’s why it’s important to continue advocacy work and make sure that political prisoners remain on the agenda. In your opinion, what is particularly important to talk about today? What are the aspects that deserve more attention?
Sergei Davidis: Ukrainian civilian hostages. In this case, it is important to at least discuss and maintain public awareness of this issue, as very little is known about these individuals. At the same time, the conditions created for Ukrainian civilian hostages by the Russian authorities are incomparably worse than the conditions of Russian prisoners.
FRF: Yes. These people are tortured, deprived of all contacts with the outside world, and, most importantly, the prison system, specifically created for the detainment of civilians, works as a shadow entity that nominally does not exist. Lack of case or official status of these detainees makes it very easy to commit all sorts of atrocities against them and creates a system that is basically impenetrable for human rights defenders and lawyers. Ukrainian civilians are basically just hostages, kidnapped by the Russian regime.
Sergei Davidis: As for a broader subject, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. It is important to attract attention. Publicity is a form of support that we give to people who have been unlawfully convicted, but it is also a very practical tool that helps us monitor their conditions of detention, and sometimes even save their lives. We cannot allow society to forget about political prisoners. Furthermore, constant attention will help us make the release of political prisoners a necessary element of any peace treaty. I repeat, this is entirely possible. But whether it becomes a reality depends largely on us.
